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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, ICAPS:

Subject: Comment on Proposed Memorandum for General Chamberlin in reference to CIG No. 19.

1. General

a. I heartily endorse your proposal to spell out CIG's overall objections in developing the National Intelligence Program. An explanation of this kind set forth in broad terms is now most timely, and should clarify any misconceptions, misunderstandings and possible confusion caused by recent IAB papers which have not always explained the relationship one to the other in building up the whole program. I believe that this explanation should by all means be circulated to the IAB.

In the interests of harmony, however, I question the advisability of quoting General Chamberlin's memo as the instrument for this explanation. I should think the same objective could be reached by addressing a short memo in answer to General Chamberlin only, calling his attention to an explanation addressed to all IAB members which merely states that recent evidence of misunderstanding from at least one IAB agency has lead to the circulation of an explanation. In this way, General Chamberlin's memo, which was sent to the Director of Central Intelligence personally, would not be publicized before the whole IAB as a horrible example. In a way, I believe to do so might constitute a breach of confidence and possibly widen the gap between CIG and G-2.

b. I, therefore, recommend deletion of paragraph 1 and rewording of paragraph 2 along lines suggested above.

c. Paragraph 3. In order to emphasize the distinct separation of NIR from collection procedures, I suggest that the first of the three general heads, "collection" be divided as follows:

(1) Collection

(a) procedures

Army review(s)
completed.

(b) requirements
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~~SECRET~~d. Paragraph 4.

(1) Inasmuch as our production paper provides for "Factual", "Staff", "Current" and "Strategic and National Policy Intelligence", I believe we better stick to these terms in order to prevent confusion. If these terms do not lend themselves to your explanation, I believe that some reference at least should be made to them in relation to the second of the three heads, "research or production".

(2) From the point of view of ONI, the treatment of Staff Intelligence is a most delicate one. Davis has told me that ONI would never submit to CIG analyses specifically prepared for Navy War Planners, since these are considered outside the realm of interest of non-military agencies (i.e. State). By this, I understood there was no objection to submission of estimates which may be interpreted as of common interest, but regardless of current directives I don't believe Navy, so long as it has any autonomy, will willingly submit any papers which reveal Navy War Plans, and therefore jeopardize their security. This fact, whether right or wrong, should be recognized. We must either be satisfied with 75 per cent coverage and fit the definition of staff intelligence to it, or else go to bat for 100 per cent coverage. I don't believe CIG is ready ^W ~~now~~ to make an issue of this.


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